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A B S T R A C T
This article seeks to draw possible lessons for adaptation programmes in Bangladesh by examining
whether cyclone preparedness and relief interventions are subject to corrupt practices. Based on a
random sample survey of 278 households, three focus-group discussions and seven key-informant
interviews, the article investigates the nature and extent of corruption in pre- and post-disaster
interventions in Khulna before and after Cyclone Aila in May 2009. Ninety nine percent of households
reported losses from corrupt practices. Post-disaster interventions (such as food aid and public works
schemes) suffered from greater levels, and worse types, of corruption than pre-disaster interventions
(such as cyclone warning systems and disaster-preparedness training). Using an asset index created
using principal component analysis, the article assesses how corruption affected wealth quartiles. Ultra-
poor households were affected more by corruption in pre-disaster interventions, the wealthiest quartile
more in certain post-disaster interventions, in particular public works and non-governmental
interventions. These ﬁndings may hold lessons for attempts to increase resilience as current adaptation
measures mirror some cyclone preparedness and relief efforts.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001, 2007)
indicates Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to climate change.
Projected impacts include greater scarcity of fresh water in the dry
season (due to less rain and higher evapotranspiration), greater
drainage congestion (due to higher levels in water courses partly
from higher sea levels), greater river bank erosion, more frequent
and severe ﬂoods and cyclones, and greater soil salinity in the
coastal zone. Such hydrological changes particularly threaten low-
lying coastal areas where citizens live in ﬂood- and cyclone-prone
locations.
The Bangladeshi government is committed to adaptation as
illustrated by the country’s National Adaptation Programme of
Action (NAPA), the Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan,
National Climate Change Trust Fund and the multi-donor Climate
Resilient Fund (for example, see MoEF, 2005, 2009, and GLCA,
2009). However, the success of programmes depends partly on the* Corresponding author. Current address: Department of Geography and Geology,
University of Copenhagen, Øster Voldgade 10, 1350 Copenhagen, Denmark.
Tel.: +45 35 32 25 00.
E-mail addresses: martin.prowse@geo.ku.dk, prowsemartin@hotmail.com
(M. Prowse).
0959-3780/$ – see front matter  2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.07.003level of ﬁduciary risk (in other words, that adaptation funds are
used for intended purposes). Here there is good reason to be
concerned. Bangladesh was ranked bottom of Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for ﬁve conse-
cutive years between 2001 and 2005. Whilst this ranking has
recently recently, the 2010 CPI still placed Bangladesh 134th from
178 countries.
To try and draw useful lessons for climate adaptation, this
article investigates the nature and extent of corruption in cyclone
preparedness and relief efforts in coastal Bangladesh. It focuses on
interventions before and after Cyclone Aila that struck South-West
Bangladesh and coast of West Bengal, India, on the 25th May, 2009.
According to the Disaster Management Bureau (2010), Aila killed
190 people directly and affected over 3.9 million (with 243,000
houses and 77,000 acres of farmland destroyed or badly damaged).
Even fourteen months afterwards, when the primary research for
this article was conducted, embankments in four upazillas (the
sub-district administrative unit) in Khulna and Satkhira districts
had not been repaired and over 47,000 households were still
homeless. A key aim of the research was to investigate how the
experience of corruption varied across wealth groups.
The article consists of ﬁve further sections. Section Two offers a
quick overview of the relationship between corruption and
development, a brief summary of the emergent literature on
corruption and climate change, before focusing on corruption in
T. Mahmud, M. Prowse / Global Environmental Change 22 (2012) 933–943934Bangladesh. The third section discusses the inherent difﬁculties of
researching corruption, and outlines the research methods and
statistical techniques employed. Sections 4 and 5 present ﬁndings
on corruption in pre- and post-disaster interventions, respectively.
The sixth section concludes.
2. Corruption in Bangladesh: an overview
The extent to which corruption impedes national development
has been a matter of debate. The intuitive argument that
corruption is one cause of low economic growth and high poverty
rates (Myrdal, 1968) can be contrasted against arguments where
corruption is seen to improve efﬁciency through overcoming
market failures caused by bureaucracies (Leff, 1964). The recent
macro-level evidence, unsurprisingly, favours the former argu-
ment, especially when considering human development, and
highlights multiple equilibria in the negative relationship between
corruption and development (see Aidt, 2009; Haque and Kneller,
2009; Qizilbash, 2001). Numerous micro-level mechanisms – such
as path dependency through reduced reporting, lower penalities
and peer-group effects – are suggested as possible channels
through which countries remain locked in a high corruption, low
development trap (see Aidt, 2009).
Despite substantial ﬁnancial ﬂows required for mitigation and
adaptation, until recently there has been little mention of
corruption within climate debates. This can partly be explained
by the burden of mitigation falling on Annex I parties where, on the
whole, there are reasonably low levels of corruption, and the late
arrival of adaptation to the climate stage (Pielke et al., 2007).
However, due partly to a lack of integrity within the Clean
Development Mechanism (Green, 2008; Ostrom, 2010), concerns
about high levels of corruption in certain forestry ministries (see
Ebeling and Yasue, 2009; Barr et al., 2010) and the pressing need to
disburse fast-start funding for adaptation, greater emphasis is now
being placed on corruption. This is most clearly demonstrated
through Transparency International’s (2011) annual report on
climate change. This includes two chapters on Bangladesh –
Martinez and Bastemeijer (2011) and Zaman and Khuda (2011) –
where it is accepted corruption is widespread and contributes to
social and economic deprivation (Iftekharuzzaman, 2009; Ifte-
kharuzzaman and Tanvir, 2008; TIB, 2008; Tanvir, 2006). For
example, the World Bank (2000) estimated if Bangladesh could
reduce corruption to the level prevailing in Scandinavian countries,
it could add 2.1 to 2.9 percent to annual per capita GDP growth.
Whilst corruption is often deﬁned as ‘the abuse of public ofﬁce
for private gain’ (see Bardhan, 1997), this article uses Transparency
International’s deﬁnition of corruption – the abuse of entrusted
power for private gain – and considers eight forms of corruptionTable 1
Extent of corruption in Bangladesh’s service sectors, June 2009–May 2010.
Sector Proportion of households
receiving services who
experienced corruption (%)
Propor
receivi
paid b
Judiciary 88.0 59.6 
Law enforcement agencies 79.7 68.1 
Land administration 71.2 67.0 
Tax, VAT & customs 51.3 43.9 
Electricity 45.9 27.6 
Local government 43.9 36.7 
Health 33.2 13.2 
Banking 17.4 12.7 
Education 15.3 15.0 
NGO 10.1 7.2 
Others 34.1 35.5 
Overall 84.2 71.9 
Source: TIB (2010).(see Transparency International, 2009; Karklins, 2002). First,
bribery, deﬁned as offering, promising, giving, accepting or
soliciting an advantage as an inducement for an action which is
illegal, unethical or a breach of trust. Second, wage/asset stripping,
which is the appropriation or illegal use of entrusted funds/goods
for personal gain. Third, extortion, deﬁned as an act of utilizing,
either directly or indirectly, one’s access to a position of power or
knowledge to coerce unmerited cooperation or compensation. For
example, a service provider may force a recipient to make an
unofﬁcial payment. Fourth, fraud, the act of intentionally deceiving
someone in order to gain unfair or illegal advantage. Fifth,
favouritism, nepotism and patronage. Usually based on acquain-
tances and kin relations, these actions involve the exploitation of
power/authority to provide unmerited opportunities for family or
friends. Patronage often seeks the cultivation of political and/or
clientelist networks. Sixth, refusal or negligence to provide services.
For instance, when service providers create a barrier so recipients
offer illicit payments. Seventh, inﬂuence peddling, deﬁned as
inﬂuencing decision-making for personal beneﬁt (and which
contrasts with legitimate political lobbying). And eighth, procure-
ment irregularities, where an ofﬁcial awards a contract or inﬂuences
the tendering process for personal interest.
Transparency International Bangladesh (2010) provides esti-
mates of the scale of corruption: 72% of households were forced to
pay bribes averaging Tk. 4834 (US$ 68.6) for receiving services
from different sectors from June 2009 to May 2010. This equates to
a mean annual per capita ﬁgure of Tk. 637 (US$ 9.04), and a total of
Tk. 95.92 billion (US$ 1.36 billion). The same survey shows the
incidence of corruption was highest in the judiciary (where 88% of
households receiving services were victims of corruption),
followed by the law enforcement services (80%) and land
administration (71%), as illustrated in Table 1.
Importantly, the impact of corruption differs across wealth
categories. Iftekharuzzaman (2009) estimates that 3.84% of annual
household income in 2007 was absorbed by corruption in six
sectors (education, health, land administration, law enforcement,
the judiciary and tax authorities). Disaggregated by income
categories, these estimates suggest low-income households lost
4.1 percent, middle-income households 3.6 percent, and high-
income households 2.4 percent of annual income.
There is also evidence some sectors central to climate policy
and adaptation – for example, forest and environment, and disaster
management and relief – suffer from corrupt practices. TIB’s
Corruption Database 2005, which utilises and veriﬁes reports of
corruption published in leading newspapers, suggests forest and
environment was one of the most corrupt sectors in Bangladeshi
society. Almost 90% of individuals reportedly involved in corrupt
practices in this sector were government ofﬁcers/employees, withtion of households
ng services who
ribes (%)
Average amount
of bribe paid
(in Taka)
National estimate
of bribes paid
(in millions of Taka)
7918 16192
3352 5014
6116 35194
6734 2235
1834 8126
913 6283
463 1691
1928 3927
168 1087
549 422
6804 11570
4834 95916
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term encapsulating extortion, favouritism/nepotism/patronage,
inﬂuence peddling, and procurement irregularities), followed by
bribery (22%) and asset stripping (8%). The database also suggests
the disaster management and relief sector suffered from lower
levels of corruption. In this sector, 91% of individuals allegedly
involved in corruption were elected representatives with 54% of
alleged cases involving the abuse of power and 37% bribery. Before
reporting our ﬁndings on corruption in pre- and post-disaster
interventions associated with Cyclone Aila, we discuss the intrinsic
difﬁculties of generating accurate data on corruption, and the
research methods and statistical techniques employed.
3. Researching corruption, methods and statistical techniques
Measuring corruption is very challenging. Not only is it a
‘hidden’ phenomenon, but corrupt practices are manifestations of
broader systemic failures which condition actors’ behaviour
(Duncan and Dutta, 2006). In this respect, abstracting isolated
incidents of corruption from wider processes risks misunderstand-
ing its impact (ibid.). That said, certain research approaches can
improve the likelihood of accurately measuring and understanding
the phenomenon. For example, Reinikka and Svensson (2006)
detail how precise deﬁnitions, triangulation with qualitative
methods and formal hypothesis testing can improve the data
generated (on this last point, see Olken, 2007, for an innovative
experimental approach). Our approach in this article – to elicit
information from beneﬁciaries of pre- and post-disaster interven-
tions – resonates strongly with the ﬁrst two of these ‘principles’.
In this respect, we explicitly differentiate the nature of
corruption we investigated, and clearly state whether data is ﬁrst
or second hand. In what follows, the extent of corruption is
measured by both its frequency (the proportion of beneﬁciaries
affected, or who claim corruption took place) and its severity.
There are two aspects to the severity of each practice. First, the
income/opportunities lost as a consequence of corrupt practices.
This is detailed where possible. Second, the vulnerability of
victims. Because corruption in pre-disaster interventions took
place before households’ vulnerability was exacerbated by Cyclone
Aila such practices have been allocated a ‘mild’ rating. In other
words, perpetrators were not certain their actions would harm (for
they were not fully aware of the imminent risk). In contrast,
corrupt practices in post-disaster interventions have been
allocated a ‘severe’ rating as such practices occurred after
households were in acute distress. In other words, perpetrators
were fully aware their actions would harm (and as such were
especially callous). We also need to be clear about ﬁrst- and
second-hand accounts of corruption. Needless to say, only data
about respondents’ own experience of corruption can be treated as
robust. The only occasion we utilise second-hand hearsay data is
regarding government attempts to reconstruct embankments (and
the reader is advised to be cautious about these results).
Fieldwork was conducted in collaboration with the Coastal
Research Foundation (CRF) during June/July 2010. A household
survey, focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews
(KIIs) were conducted. It should be noted the study area is remote
with little infrastructure or law and order. Before entering the ﬁeld it
was essential to develop a good network with law enforcement
agencies and elites to ensure the security of the research team.
Unsurprisingly in such a context, some respondents were nervous or
were interrupted by friends or family members during the interview.
These questionnaires were excluded from the analysis.
The survey was conducted in one upazilla in Khulna, due to the
severe impact of Aila on this part of the coastal belt. A three-stage
random sampling technique was followed: one union was randomly
selected from the upazilla; four wards were randomly selected fromthe union; and 75 households were randomly selected from each
ward. As a sampling frame was not available in this post-disaster
setting, we utilized a transect approach. Depending on the
population size in the ward, every ﬁfth to ninth household was
selected. The study aimed to sample 300 households, but during data
cleaning 22 questionnaires were excluded as the veracity of
responses was questionable. Eight experienced assistants were
recruited and trained for the survey. Each enumerator surveyed six
to seven households per day. Questionnaires were checked each
evening by the lead researcher and unsuitable questionnaires
returned. In cases where the household head was not available,
subsequent visits were made. If the household head was still not
available, an adult decision maker was interviewed.
Survey data was triangulated with three focus group discussions
conducted with different community groups: women, the social
elite (school teachers, religious leaders, public ofﬁcers, and
businessmen), and farmers/day labourers (averaging ten partici-
pants). Seven key informant interviews were also conducted during
and after the survey to assess corruption in disaster management.
Informants included the Member of Parliament, chairmen of
upazilla parishad and union parishad, government ofﬁcers, a
representative from a civil society organisation, and journalists.
Semi-structured checklists were used during both FGDs and KIIs.
To enable the comparison of corruption across wealth catego-
ries, we utilised an asset index. Different authors suggest various
methods and techniques to construct such indices (for example,
see Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Hulme and McKay, 2005; Moser
and Felton, 2007), and they are being utilised with increasing
frequency (see, for example, Ansoms and McKay, 2010; Dasgupta
and Baschierri, 2010; Marivoet and Keje, 2011). A recent overview
of applications is offered by Harttgen and Klasen (2012) who argue
asset indices can be seen as robust proxies for income/expenditure
data (but not consumption data, see Howe et al., 2009). As such,
they argue whilst asset indices are not perfect proxies they provide
a good indicator of long-term living standards.
We utilised principal components analysis (PCA), a data
reduction technique to summarise an original set of variables to
a set of uncorrelated components. Such an approach offers a
straightforward and parsimonious way of assessing wealth, and
arguably vulnerability and adaptive capacity (see Adger et al.,
2004; Rygel et al., 2006). Our sample size of 278 households is
sufﬁcient for PCA (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). We used the
Sustainable Rural Livelihoods framework as a guiding tool
(Chambers and Conway, 1992; Carney, 1999). Under this
framework ﬁve types of capital assets are distinguished: human
capital, socio-political capital; natural capital; physical capital; and
ﬁnancial capital. Under these ﬁve capitals, we used 17 variables
from reported data on asset holdings before Aila:
 Human capital: years of education of household head.
 Social/political capital: social and political connections of
households (whether they take part in salish – a social system
for informal arbitration of petty disputes; are a member of a
school management/religious committee; or have relatives
among government ofﬁcers, journalists, or public representa-
tives).
 Natural capital: total cultivatable land (acres).
 Physical capital: type of housing structure and ownership of
consumer durables/capital goods (TV, radio, bike, pots, table and
chairs, mobile phone).
 Financial capital: average monthly household income.
Second, the variables within physical capital and socio-political
capital were aggregated using nominal weights: monetary value
for the former (apart from housing which also accrued a non-
monetary value); authors’ expertise for the latter. Third, we
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cantly correlated at the 99% level. Fourth, appropriate robustness
checks were utilised to ensure data was suitable for Principal
Components Analysis. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin Measure of
Sampling Adequacy tested for the proportion of variance in the
variables caused by underlying processes. The result of 0.74 is well
within the necessary range for PCA (>0.5 and <1). The data also
satisﬁed the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Approximate Chi-Square
251.968; d.f. 10; Sig. 0.000) which tested the hypothesis the
correlations in the correlation matrix are zero (but which is very
sensitive to sample size – see Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).
As Table 2 shows, PCA extracted one component from the ﬁve
capitals with the necessary eigenvalue of greater than 1 (again, see
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). This component explained 47% of the
variance in the original variables. The component score coefﬁcients
show the factor loadings applied to the ﬁve variables to construct
the asset index (human capital 0.257, natural capital 0.287, socio-
political capital 0.263, ﬁnancial capital score 0.31, physical capital
score 0.338). Fifth, the asset score was sorted in an ascending
fashion and used to divide the households into four equally-sized
wealth quartiles: ultra poor, poor, a middle group and the wealthy.
We now turn to our ﬁndings, ﬁrst on corruption in pre-disaster
interventions.
4. Corruption in pre-disaster Interventions
Three pre-disaster interventions are now discussed: cyclone
warning systems; disaster-preparedness training; and access to
cyclone shelters. Each part assesses access to these services across
the four wealth quartiles.
4.1. Cyclone warning systems
The survey found only 38% of households received a warning
message before Aila (see Table 3). Looking into the wealth
quartiles, a higher proportion of wealthy households received a
message (55%) compared to poorer households (signiﬁcant at the
99% level). For example, only 24% of ultra-poor households
received one. Table 3 also shows households’ perception of the
suitability of warning messages before Aila, with 83% notTable 3
- Warning message before Aila by wealth quartiles.
Poverty Quartiles Received warning message (%) 
Yes No 
Ultra Poor 24.3 75.7 
Poor 44.3 55.7 
Middle 29 71 
Wealthy 55.1 49.9 
Total 38.1 61.9 
a = 0.01, d.f = 3, x2 = 17.65 
Source: household survey.
Table 2
Total variance explained: principal component analysis.
Component Initial eigen values 
Total % of variance Cumulativ
1 2.337 46.736 46.736 
2 .945 18.895 65.632
3 .688 13.755 79.387
4 .566 11.317 90.704
5 .465 9.296 100.000
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Extraction method: principal component analysis.considering messages as ‘appropriate’. Looking into poverty
quartiles, 93% of ultra-poor households through to 72% of wealthy
households considered the messages as ‘inappropriate’ (signiﬁcant
at the 99% level). The survey also enquired about the different ways
warning messages were received by households (see Table 4).
Here, the difference between wealth groups is not substantial. For
example, most of the poorest (46.7%) and wealthiest households
(54.3%) received warning messages by radio or television, from the
market place or from friends/relatives.
That many households did not receive a warning message poses
questions about the effectiveness of early warning systems.
Speciﬁcally, it suggests a negligence to provide services.
Bangladesh has a good administrative set-up within local
government. Along with the Weather Forecast Department and
Disaster Management Committee at the local level, the union
parishad (lower tier of local government) is responsible for the
dissemination of warning messages by different means (including
a microphone announcement). It appears many of these systems
failed.
In addition, although 38% of households received a cyclone
warning before Aila, they did not take it seriously enough.
Participants in two FGDs explained as the height of the previous
tidal surge during Cyclone Sidr in 2007 was over-estimated, many
people under-estimated the height during Aila. In addition, Aila
was only given a category 7 cyclone rating. As people in this
upazilla are used to facing more serious threats, they did not give
the warning message sufﬁcient credence. Respondents also
suggested businessmen, with the help of Water Development
Board ofﬁcials, had weakened the strength of embankments
through cutting holes so saline water could allow shrimp
cultivation. A high tidal surge, excessive water pressure and poor
maintenance meant ‘‘everything was destroyed within a single
moment. Many people were washed away with the tidal surge, others
were helpless struggling to survive’’.
4.2. Disaster preparedness training
We now consider whether households attended disaster
preparedness training before or after Aila. Table 5 shows only
14% of households attended a training session beforehand. This is aAppropriateness of Aila message (%)
Total Yes No Total
100 7.2 92.8 100
100 20.3 79.7 100
100 11.6 88.4 100
100 27.5 72.5 100
100 16.7 83.3 100
a = 0.007, d.f = 3, x2 = 12.209
Extraction sums of squared loadings
e % Total % of variance Cumulative %
2.37 46.736 46.736
Table 4
Medium of warning message by wealth quartiles.
Wealth category (%) Warning Message Received from
Market or friends or relatives Radio or television Mike announcement or mobile text message Total
Ultra poor 45% 45% 10% 100%
Poor 39.5% 50% 10.5% 100%
Middle 28.6% 61.9% 9.5% 100%
Wealthy 31.9% 51.1% 17% 100%
Source: household survey, based on multiple responses.
Table 5
- Disaster preparedness training program before and after Aila.
Wealth quartiles Disaster preparedness training/
program before Aila (%)
Disaster preparedness training/
program after Aila (%)
Irregularities in training program (%)
Yes No Total Yes No Total Yes No No response Total
Ultra poor 10 90 100 21.4 78.6 100 22.9 35.7 41.4 100
Poor 17.1 82.9 100 12.9 87.1 100 35.7 28.6 35.7 100
Middle 8.7 91.3 100 17.4 82.6 100 40.6 24.6 34.8 100
Wealthy 21.7 78.3 100 29 71 100 24.6 44.9 30.4 100
Total 14.4 85.6 100 20.1 79.9 100 30.9 33.5 35.6 100
a = 0.095, d.f = 3, x2 = 6.367 a = 0.109, d.f = 3, x2 = 6.061 Substantial proportion of non responses
Source: Household survey.
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looking into wealth quartiles, the greatest proportion is the 22% of
wealthy households. Middle strata households (9%) attended less
than both poor (17%) and ultra-poor households (10%) (the chi-
squared statistic reports signiﬁcance at the 90% level of conﬁ-
dence).
Table 5 also displays a slightly different picture regarding
participation in training after Aila. Overall, 80% of households did
not attend any training after the cyclone. Again, a greater
proportion of wealthy households (29%) managed to attend, this
time followed by the ultra poor (21%), middle households (17%)
and poor households (13%) but these differences are not
statistically signiﬁcant (x2 = 6.061, 3 degrees of freedom,
( = 0.109). In addition, Table 5 illustrates the nature of irregularities
in disaster preparedness training (based on those attending
training sessions). It shows 31% of these households observed
irregularities, particularly middle (41%) and poor households
(35.7%). The most prominent irregularity was nepotism and the
same people attending training sessions (Table 6).
4.3. Access to cyclone shelters
The survey enquired about respondents’ access to cyclone
shelters. Table 7 shows the types of shelter used by households
during Aila: 58% took shelter on an embankment or at home and
32% in a union parishad/school/or other concrete building.
Importantly, only 10% accessed a cyclone shelter, varying fromTable 6
Types of irregularity in disaster preparedness training program by wealth quartiles.
Wealth quartiles Types of irregularities in training
program (%)
Total
Nepotism/same
people attended
various training
Trainee selection
based on political
considerations
Ultra poor 57.1 42.9 100
Poor 71.9 28.1 100
Middle group 67.7 32.3 100
Wealthiest 57.1 42.9 100
Source: Household survey, based on multiple responses.4.3% of ultra-poor households to 13% of wealthy households (these
differences are not statistically signiﬁcant). Table 7 also shows 31%
were refused access to shelters with the greatest proportions
coming from middle (38%) and poor (32%) households (again, these
differences are not statistically signiﬁcant).
Furthermore, the table highlights reasons for the lack of access
to shelters. It shows 50% of responses pinpointed space constraints,
and 41% referred to households not having enough time to reach
shelters (which raises questions regarding the timing of early
warning systems, as well as the location of shelters – on these
points see Vogt et al., 2009). Only 9% of responses from households
claimed space was reserved by the elite (although, interestingly,
25% of the ultra poor thought so).
Data from focus groups support these ﬁndings. For example,
one participant from the women’s group explained: ‘‘due to space
constraints many people did not get in a cyclone shelter. as they were
far away from their house, or they previously had a bad experience.
Most of the people were forced to take shelter on the embankment
though it was not safe’’. Overall, and despite the widespread
negligence to provide warning messages about Aila, we ﬁnd a
relatively low level of ‘mild’ corruption in pre-disaster interven-
tions compared to post-disaster relief interventions, to which we
now turn.
5. Corruption in post-disaster relief interventions
Post-disaster relief interventions are particularly prone to
corruption because of the swift, substantial ﬂow of resources
required to meet the pressing needs of affected households. Such
relief programmes are sequential. First, short- and long-term
recovery interventions bring immediate relief to affected house-
holds. Later, rehabilitation interventions, such as grants for house
rebuilding and embankment reconstruction provide longer-term
assistance. We discuss a number of interventions under each
category. The ﬁrst part focuses on post-disaster recovery inter-
ventions, the second rehabilitation interventions. Moreover, we
discuss three types of government recovery schemes: ﬁrst,
emergency recovery relief (where households received Tk.
3000–5000); second, one medium-term relief intervention
(where households received 20 kg of rice each month); and third,
Table 7
Access to types of shelter during Aila.
Wealth quartiles Shelter taken during Aila (%) Refused access to
cyclone shelter (%)
Reasons for lack of access to cyclone
shelter (%)*
Cyclone
shelter
Union parishad/school/
other concrete building
Embankment/
at home
Total Yes No Total Reserved by
social elite
No
space
Not enough
time to/other
Total
Ultra poor 4.3 25.7 70 100 25 75 100 25 33.3 41.7 100
Poor 10 38.6 51.4 100 32.1 67.9 100 12 52 36 100
Middle 13 30.4 56.5 100 38.9 61.1 100 3.7 59.3 37 100
Wealthy 13 34.8 52.2 100 26.8 73.2 100 0 43.8 56.3 100
Total 10.1 32.4 57.6 100 30.9 69.1 100 8.75 50 41.25 100
a = 0.222, d.f = 6, x2 = 8.23 a = 0.422, d.f = 3,
x2 = 2.809
*Percentages based on multiple responses
Source: Household survey.
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received cash/food in return for participating in public works.
We also brieﬂy discuss NGO post-disaster interventions. As
outlined above, corruption in all these interventions received a
‘severe’ rating (due to the extreme vulnerability of recipient
households).
5.1. Emergency recovery relief (Tk. 3000–5000 per household)
After Aila, government stated it would provide Tk. 3-5,000 (US$
43-72) to each affected household to meet immediate basic needs
(with the amount depending on damage to housing stock). Table 8
shows 97% of households received this relief (with little variation by
wealth quartile). However, Table 8 shows a higher proportion of
wealthy households (19.4%) received more than the stipulated
single card (signiﬁcant at the 99% level of conﬁdence). This was
because household size was the main criteria for allocating cards
(with households with six or more members receiving two, twelve
or more receiving three) and the average size of households
increases through wealth quartiles (from 4.33 to 5.09). However,
Table 8 does outline more ultra-poor households (8%) were forced to
pay bribes compared to other wealth categories (signiﬁcant at the
90% level of conﬁdence) and paid larger bribes than other categories
(again signiﬁcant at the 90% level). Thus, survey data suggests the
programme did suffer from a low level of corruption. Interestingly, it
also reveals a substantial proportion of actors receiving bribes were
not local government representatives – such as union parishad
members (30%) and chairmen (10%) – but middlemen (60%).
Qualitative methods highlighted how further local ofﬁcials saw
an opportunity from this relief programme: the local land tax
collector and chief administrative ofﬁcer attempted to collect
outstanding land taxes from the cash transfer. Whilst a media
campaign and interventions by the Member of Parliament and
upazilla chairmen stopped this opportunistic taxation, no action
was taken against the actors involved. We now turn to corruption
in medium-term recovery relief.Table 8
Emergency recovery relief (Tk. 3000–5000 per household).
Wealth quartile Receipt of emergency
recovery relief (%)
Number of relief cards receiv
Yes No Total One Two Three
Ultra poor 95.7 4.3 100 97 3 0 
Poor 98.6 1.4 100 89.9 10.1 0 
Middle 97.1 2.9 100 98.5 1.5 0 
Wealthy 97.1 2.9 100 79.1 19.4 1.5 
Overall (%) 97.1 2.9 100 91.1 8.5 0.4 
a = 0.796, d.f = 3, x2 = 1.023 a = 0.002, d.f = 6, x2 = 20.584 
Source: Household survey.5.2. Medium-term recovery relief (20 kg rice per household)
Following the immediate payment of cash transfers to house-
holds, government provided 20kgs of rice per month for each
household affected by Aila. Table 9 shows 98% of households
received this recovery relief. Slightly fewer ultra-poor households
received rice compared to other quartiles. More importantly, survey
data shows 99% of households received less rice than they were
entitled to, with an average loss of 9% (similar across wealth
categories). Again, households were asked which actor was involved
in this form of corruption. Survey data shows 74% of households
suffering from this corrupt practice reported union parishad
members were responsible (followed by 20% of households citing
union parishad chairmen, and 6% reporting middlemen).
Qualitative research methods examined whether there were
consistent rules and regulations in both emergency and medium-
term recovery relief. Informants stated members and chairmen of
union parishad hold high levels of discretionary power to allocate
relief cards and distribute goods. For example, one participant
explained ‘‘nobody received according to their entitlement. . .even if
the chairman or member said that one card will be given for 6
members of a household, two cards for the members who are more
than 6 and 3 cards for 12 members or above, this rule varied from
person to person. The cronies of chairmen or members got more beneﬁt
from them’’. But when we compare the amount of rice received
across categories on a per adult equivalent basis – ultra-poor
households 5.59 kgs, poor households 5.21 kgs, middle households
4.91 and wealthy households 4.87 – we ﬁnd wealthier households
actually received less than poorer households (an analysis of
variance shows this is not statistically signiﬁcant: dfs = 3, 267 F
ratio = 1.629, F test = 0.183). Whilst there may have been cases
where union parishad chairmen or members distributed cards as a
form of patronage, the greater number of cards received by
wealthy households was due mainly to household size, not
favouritism. We now turn to the last post-disaster recovery
interventions: a public works programme.ed (%) Forced to pay bribes (%) Average bribe paid
 Total (%) Yes No Total (%) (Taka)
100 7.7 92.3 100 1890
100 1.5 98.5 100 1000
100 4.6 95.4 100 350
100 0 100 100 0
100 3.4 96.6 100 1277.8
a = 0.077, d.f = 3, x2 = 6.838 dfs = 2, 6 F
ratio = 3.912
F test = 0.08
Table 9
Medium-term recovery relief and cash/food for work.
Medium-term recovery relief (20kg rice per household) Cash/food for work
Wealth quartiles Received 20kg rice (%) Missing rice
(% of total)
Involvement in
cash/food for Work
programme (%)
Types of irregularities* (%) Bribe paid or
wage lost
Loss in
wage/bribes
(% of monthly
income
Yes No Total Yes No Total Wage
stripping
Delayed/
Uncertain
Payment
Low quality of
work/misuse
of resources
Bribery Total (Taka)
Ultra poor 94.3 5.7 100 9.43 75.7 24.3 100 45.2 35.5 14 5.4 100 1548.9 77.12
Poor 97.1 2.9 100 9.52 90 10 100 36.1 39.2 22.7 2.1 100 1520.9 66.32
Middle 98.6 1.4 100 9.34 84.1 15.9 100 31.1 46.6 17.5 4.9 100 1316.5 63.97
Wealthy 100 0 100 8.81 68.1 31.9 100 41.9 35.5 20.4 2.2 100 2596.8 98.19
Overall (%) 97.5 2.5 100 9.28 79.5 20.5 100 38.34 39.4 18.65 3.63 100 1765.5 76.54
a=0.168, d.f = 3,
x2 =5.050
a=0.008, d.f = 3, x2 =11.716 *Based on multiple responses dfs =3, 78 F ratio =1.424 F
test =0.242
Source: Household survey.
Table 10
Irregularities in NGO relief interventions.
Wealth quartile Irregularities in NGO
relief (%)
Total Types of irregularities (%)* Total
Yes No Bribery/stripping Nepotism Inﬂuence peddling Low quality goods
Ultra poor 47.8 52.2 100 24.1 19 46.6 10.3 100
Poor 58.6 41.4 100 15.4 29.5 35.9 19.2 100
Middle 69.6 30.4 100 19.8 32.7 34.7 12.9 100
Wealthy 79.7 20.3 100 17.9 35.8 32.1 14.2 100
Overall 63.9 36.1 100 18.95 30.61 36.15 14.29 100
a=0.001, d.f = 3, x2 =17.026 *Based on multiple responses
Source: Household survey.
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Table 11
Nature and extent of corruption in pre- and post-disaster interventions.
Stage Intervention types Type of evidence:
hearsay/own
experience
Nature and extent of corruption
Severity of
corrupt
practice:
mild/severe
Incidence of
corruptiona
Type/s of corruption Bribery paid or
relief received
(taka or %)
Primary actor (s) Primary victim
Pre-disaster
interventions
Warning message Own experience Mild Very high (83%) Negligence to provide services NA Government Ofﬁcer,
Public Representative
Ultra poor
Disaster preparedness
training
Own experience Mild Medium (31%) Nepotism/favouritism/patronage NA Government ofﬁcer Middle and poor
Access to cyclone
shelter
Own experience Mild Low (9%) Inﬂuence peddling NA Social elite All
Post-disaster
interventions
Emergency recovery
relief
Own experience Severe Low (exclusion – 3%;
bribery – 3%)
Negligence to provide services,
bribery/stripping
Tk. 1277 Exclusion: members and
chairman of union parishad
bribes: middlemen
Ultra poor
Mid-term recovery
relief
Own experience Severe Very high (exclusion – 3%;
stripping – 99%)
Bribery/stripping, negligence
to provide services
9.28% Members and chairman
of union parishad
All
Cash/food for work Own experience Severe High (68%) Bribery/stripping, misuse of
resources, fraud
Tk. 1765 Middlemen; member and
chairman of union parishad
Wealthy
Embankment
reconstruction
Hearsay Severe Very high (94%) Misuse of resources, bribery stripping,
procurement irregularities, negligence
to provide services
Estimated by key
informant to be
40–55% of total
project
Syndicate of ruling
party activists
All
NGO interventions Own experience Severe High (64%) Inﬂuence peddling, nepotism/
favouritism/patronage,
bribery/stripping
Tk. 627 Middlemen, NGO ofﬁcers,
member and chairman
of union parishad
Wealthy
a incidence of corruption: low=<25%; medium=26–50% incidence of corruption; high=51–75% incidence of corruption; very high=>75%.
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As land in the upazilla was ﬂooded with saline water, reduced
labour demand forced many mobile residents to migrate to ﬁnd
work. To tackle this situation, government launched a cash/food-
for-work scheme. Overall, 80% of households participated in the
scheme at some stage, with a greater proportion of poor and
middle households than ultra-poor and wealthy (statistically
signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level, see Table 9). However, the
scheme was plagued by discrepancies. Overall, 68% of respondents
reported irregularities, particularly with wage stripping and
delayed or uncertain payment (see Table 9).
Qualitative methods examined these irregularities. One focus
group complained the enrolment list for the scheme, created on the
ﬁrst day, was not updated as the number of workers decreased,
that chairmen of the union parishad added false names, and that
labourers did not receive a ﬁxed amount of rice. Table 9 shows the
average wages lost or bribes paid by households in this scheme
came to Tk. 1766 (US$ 25). Looking into wealth quartiles, wealthy
households lost more wages (both in absolute terms and as a
proportion of monthly income) compared to other groups.
A further issue highlighted by focus groups was the low quality
of work conducted on the scheme. For example, one participant
reported: ‘‘the work was awarded to inexperienced sub-contractors.
They do not know how to reconstruct roads, dams or embankments
especially in the coastal belt. After ﬁnishing some work, the roads/
embankments were just washed away by a tidal surge. They used this
as an excuse not to pay wages to workers’’.
Overall, recovery relief after Aila suffered from varied levels of
corruption: low levels of bribery in the Tk. 5000 programme; very
high levels of asset stripping by union parishad chairmen and
members in the food distribution programme; and high levels of
wage stripping and delayed/uncertain payment, as well as other
irregularities, in the public works programme. We now turn to
corruption in one post-disaster rehabilitation intervention.
6. Rehabilitation intervention
Here we consider one major government programme: embank-
ment reconstruction. In July 2009, the Ministry of Food and
Disaster Management allocated Tk. 1150 million (US$ 16.4 million)
to the Water Development Board for the repair of vital embank-
ments damaged or destroyed in Aila. This section examines
people’s perceptions about government’s steps to reconstruct
embankments, and tries to identify the extent of corruption in this
intervention. As highlighted above, because this data is not based
on direct experience but on hearsay we need to be cautious about
these ﬁndings.
The ﬁrst point to note is the Water Development Board failed to
commence embankment reconstruction promptly. For example,
on 7th April 2010, the Prime Minister criticised ofﬁcials for this
failure (The Daily Star, 2010). The Prime Minister’s dissatisfaction
is reﬂected in respondents’ perceptions: 82% did not feel necessary
action had been taken to reconstruct embankments after Aila, and
almost 60% were fully dissatisﬁed with the government’s response.
Two focus groups stated a clear preference the army should have
been deployed from the start for this vital task.
Survey data shows 94% of respondents reported irregularities in
the embankment reconstruction process including the misuse of
resources, low quality of work and corrupt tendering. The political
mechanisms at work here were hard to untangle. It was reported
the main contractor was prevented from working due to pressure
from a cadre within the ruling political party. Moreover, it was
stated the contractor was forced to sub-contract to this cadre: in
other words, it was alleged local government representatives,
party activists and wealthy households, under the protection of theMember of Parliament, formed a syndicate which was sub-
contracted to complete the work. Due to time pressure, the
research could not pursue this line of enquiry. We now turn to the
ﬁnal post-disaster intervention: NGO programmes.
6.1. NGO post-disaster interventions
The survey found 98% of households received some kind of
relief (in cash or in kind) from NGOs (ranging from 100% of ultra-
poor households to 94.2% of wealthy households, signiﬁcant at the
95% level). Overall 64% found irregularities in NGO operations,
with, interestingly, wealthy households (80%) reporting the
greatest incidence of corrupt practices (signiﬁcant at the 99%
level with one non response excluded). Table 10 also shows
inﬂuence peddling by representatives and nepotism were the most
common irregularity, followed by bribery and asset stripping. In
addition, the quality and appropriateness of goods distributed by
NGOs was questioned. For example, one participant in a FGD stated
‘‘most often the relief goods were not suitable for Bangladesh
considering the socio-economic condition. For example, they gave
mosquito nets which are washable only in a machine, and they gave
tents which are not suitable for high temperatures so get damaged
within a few months due to the hot weather and rain.’’
The amount paid in bribes by twenty three households varied
across the poverty/wealth categories. On average, ultra-poor
households paid Tk. 325, poor households Tk. 330, middle
households Tk. 438 and wealthy households Tk. 1040 (dfs = 3,
19 F ratio = 1.62 F test = 0.218). Over half these households paid
this bribe to a middleman, with the remaining households either
paying an NGO ofﬁcer or a member/chairman of the union
parishad.
7. Discussion
Almost every household surveyed reported losses from corrupt
practices before or after Aila. The key ﬁndings are summarised in
Table 11. Overall, whilst poorer households were affected more by
‘mild’ corruption in pre-disaster interventions, the incidence of
corruption in these schemes was lower than in post-disaster
operations, especially food aid distributions and public works.
Interestingly, wealthy households were affected more by the
‘severe’ corruption after Aila, especially within public works and
non-governmental interventions. These ﬁndings contrast with
Iftekharuzzaman’s (2009) national ﬁndings where poorer house-
holds bore the brunt of corrupt practices (due to the higher
proportion of income spent). Our ﬁndings also highlight different
types of corruption before and after Aila: negligence to provide
services and nepotism were most common within pre-disaster
interventions. In post-disaster interventions, wage/asset stripping,
bribery and the misuse of resources were most prevalent.
8. Conclusion
Broadening out from this particular case, these ﬁndings may
hold relevance for agencies involved in adaptation. Bangladesh is
frequently applauded for efforts to mainstream adaptation into
policy (such as through integrating climate concerns into the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) and creating the necessary
funding mechanisms to absorb large climate resource ﬂows (such
as the National Climate Change Trust Fund and Climate Resilience
Fund). Vibrant civil society organisations in Bangladesh have
supported autonomous adaptation initiatives such as community-
based adaptation (for example, see Huq and Reid, 2007). However,
our ﬁndings suggest without increasing integrity, hard-won
funding will not increase the resilience of poor households and
communities to the extent it might.
T. Mahmud, M. Prowse / Global Environmental Change 22 (2012) 933–943942This is because there is considerable overlap between the eight
interventions assessed here and the adaptation pillars highlighted
by the Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, and early projects
ﬁnanced by Climate Change Trust Fund and Climate Resilience
Fund. For example, the Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
covers a ten-year period (2009–2018) implemented in two phases:
2009–2013 and 2014–2018 (MoEF, 2009). In the ﬁrst phase
government highlighted six pillars, the ﬁrst three of which
resonate with the cyclone preparedness and relief efforts evaluated
in this article: food security, social protection and health;
comprehensive disaster management; infrastructure; research
and knowledge management; mitigation and low carbon devel-
opment; and capacity building & institutional strengthening
(MoEF, 2009:27–32). Moreover, the funding allocation under the
Climate Change Trust Fund shows a distinct focus on disaster
preparedness and relief efforts. Of the US$95.36 million allocated
to projects as of December 2011, over US$56 million was directed
to projects under the ﬁrst three pillars of the Strategy and Action
Plan. Indeed, the ﬁrst approved project was US$25 million for
constructing cyclone shelters. The budget allocations under the
Climate Change Trust Fund also show the Water Development
Board as the ministry receiving the greatest proportion of funds,
the same body which 94% of respondents alleged was involved in
corrupt practices during embankment reconstruction. Turning to
the Climate Resilience Fund, some initial projects also reﬂect
similar disaster preparedness priorities, including the construction
of cyclone shelters.
The precise anti-corruption measures that might work within
adaptation projects are not easy to discern. For example, the
literature on corruption outlines generic approaches such as extra
payments to civil servants to increase honesty (so-called efﬁciency
wages), increased competition between public ofﬁcials, increased
monitoring and sustained public awareness campaigns (see
Bardhan, 1997). Olken (2007) usefully contrasts such traditional,
top-down instruments with grassroots, local-level monitoring (for
example, the use of social audit tools, or supporting transparent
and competitive procurement systems through engaging civil
society in tendering and selection processes). In the Indonesian
case Olken (2007) examined, the conventional threat of a top-
down audit reduced corruption to a greater extent than bottom-up
local-level monitoring. It may well be the case that experimenting
with speciﬁc anti-corruption measures in Bangladesh could shed
light on effective remedies. Whilst only a ﬁrst step, such analysis
could assist government, non-governmental organisations and
development partners in formulating a range of innovative
measures during implementation.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to convey their deepest sense of
gratitude to respondents of the survey, participants of focus group
discussion, and key informants for sharing their experiences and
insightful observations on pre- and post-disaster interventions.
The authors would also like to thank the ﬁeld research team –
Dhiman Mondol, Parthajit Roy, Utpal Kumar Das, Shaikh Shahidul
Islam, Shuvro Chandan Mahali, S.M. Khaledur Rahman, Md. Nazrul
Islam and Tanmay Mondal – for their hard work during data
collection and entry.
In addition, the authors thank Nihar Ronjon Roy and Bishawjit
Mallick for their help in understanding the local socio-political
context before and after Aila, as well as the Coastal Research
Foundation (CRF) for being a partner and providing support during
the ﬁeld survey. The authors would like to thank the Flemish
Interuniversity Council (VLIR) for the scholarship that enabled this
study. Additional ﬁeldwork ﬁnance was received from the Institute
of Development Policy and Management (IOB), Antwerp, Belgium.Comments from reviewers and editors are gratefully acknowl-
edged. Finally, this publication is an independent and collaborative
effort between both authors. It does not represent the views of TI
Bangladesh, IOB or the Department of Geography and Geology,
University of Copenhagen.
References
Adger, W.N., Brooks, N., Bentham, G., Agnew, M., Eriksen, S., 2004. New indicators of
vulnerability and adaptive capacity. In: Technical Report 7, Tyndall Centre for
Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich.
Aidt, T., 2009. Corruption, institutions, and economic development’. Oxford Review
of Economic Policy 25 (2), 271–291.
Ansoms, A., McKay, A., 2010. A quantitative analysis of poverty and livelihood
proﬁles: The case of rural Rwanda. Food Policy 35, 584–598.
Bardhan, P., 1997. Corruption and development: a review of issues. Journal of
Economic Literature 35, 1320–1346.
Barr, C., Dermawan, A., Purnomo, H., Komarudin, H., 2010. Financial governance and
Indonesia’s reforestation fund during the Soeharto and post-Soeharto periods,
1989–2009: a political economic analysis of lessons for REDD+. In: Occasional
Paper 52, CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.
Carney, D. (Ed.), 1999. Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: What Contribution can we
make? DfID, London.
Chambers, R., Conway, G.R., 1992. Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts
for the 21st century. In: Discussion Paper 296, Institute of Development Studies,
Brighton, UK.
Dasgupta, A., Baschierri, A., 2010. Vulnerability to climate change in rural ghana:
mainstreaming climate change in poverty reduction strategies. Journal of
International Development 22, 803–820.
Duncan, N., Dutta, I., 2006. Guest editors’ introduction. World Development 34 (2),
324–327.
Ebeling, J., Yasue, M., 2009. The effectiveness of market-based conservation in the
tropics: Forest certiﬁcation in Ecuador and Bolivia. Journal of Environmental
Management 90, 1145–1153.
Filmer, D., Pritchett, L., 2001. Estimating wealth effects without expenditure data –
or tears: an application to educational enrolments in states of India. Demogra-
phy 38 (1), 115–132.
Global Leadership for Climate Action (GLCA), 2009. Facilitating an International
Agreement on climate change: adaptation to climate change, June 2009.
www.globalclimateaction.org
Green, J., 2008. Delegation and accountability in the clean development mecha-
nism: the new authority of non-state actors. Journal of International Law and
International Relations 4 (2), 21–55.
Haque, M.E., Kneller, R., 2009. Corruption clubs: endogenous thresholds in corrup-
tion and development. Economic Governance 10, 345–373.
Harttgen,K., Klasen,K., 2012. A household-based human development index. world
development, 40 (5), 878-899.
Hulme, D., McKay, A., 2005. Identifying and measuring chronic poverty: beyond
monetary measures. In: The Many Dimensions of Poverty Conference, Brasilia,
Brazil, June 2005.
Huq, S., Reid, H., 2007. Community-based adaptation: a vital approach to the threat
climate change poses to the poor. In: IIED, Brieﬁng, International Institute for
Environment and Development, London.
Iftekharuzzaman, Tanvir, M. 2008. Country Report – Corruption in Water Sector
in Bangladesh. In: Transparency International, 2008. Global Corruption Re-
port 2008. Transparency International, Cambridge University Press, pp. 181–
186.
Iftekharuzzaman, 2009. Corruption & human insecurity in Bangladesh. In: Paper
presented at the NTS-Asia Annual Convention, Singapore, November, 3–4,
2009.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), IPCC Working Group II, 2001.
Climate Change 2001: Impacts Adaptation and Vulnerability. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, UK.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007. Climate change 2007:
impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. In: Contribution of Working Group II to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Karklins, R., 2002. Capitalism, corruption, and something else – typology of post-
communist corruption. Problem of Post Communism 49 (4), 22–32.
Leff, N., 1964. Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. American
Behavioral Scientist 8 (3), 8–14.
Marivoet, W., Keje, H., 2011. Approfondir le proﬁlage ge´ographique de la pauvrete´
en RDC: l’introduction d’indices composites sur base des avoirs. In: Discussion
Paper 2011.1, Institute of Development Policy and Management (IOB), Univer-
sity of Antwerp, Belgium.
Martinez, G., Bastemeijer, T., 2011. Climate change adaptation and water
integrity: a global challenge to address local realities. In: Transparency
International, 2011. Global Corruption Report: Climate Change. Earthscan,
London.
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), 2005. National Adaptation Program of
Action, Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka, http://www.moef.gov.bd/
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), 2009. Bangladesh Climate Change
Strategy and Action Plan 2009. Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka, http://
www.moef.gov.bd/.
T. Mahmud, M. Prowse / Global Environmental Change 22 (2012) 933–943 943Moser, C., Felton, A., 2007. The construction of an asset index: measuring asset
accumulation in Ecuador. In: CPRC Working Paper 87, Chronic Poverty Research
Centre, University of Manchester, UK.
Myrdal, G., 1968. Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations. The
Twentieth Century Fund, New York.
Olken, B., 2007. Monitoring corruption: evidence from a ﬁeld experiment in
Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy 115 (2), 200–249.
Ostrom, E., 2010. Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global
environmental change. Global Environmental Change 20 (4), 550–557.
Pielke, R., Prins, G., Rayner, S., Sarewitz, D., 2007. Lifting the taboo on adaptation.
Nature 445, 597–598.
Qizilbash, M., 2001. Corruption and human development. Oxford Development
Studies 29 (3), 265–278.
Reinikka, R., Svensson, J., 2006. Using micro-surveys to measure and explain
corruption. World Development 34 (2), 359–370.
Rygel, L., O’Sullivan, D., Yarnall, B., 2006. A method for constructing a social
vulnerability index: an application to hurricane storm surges in a developed
country. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 11, 741–
764.Tabachnick, B.G., Fidell, L.S., 2007. Using Multivariate Statistics. Pearson, Boston, US.
Tanvir, M., 2006. Corruption Database 2005. Transparency International
Bangladesh, July 5, 2006, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
The Daily Star, 2010. PM Lambasts Tardy Embankment Repair. April 8, 2010, Dhaka.
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), 2008. National Household Survey
2007 on Corruption in Bangladesh, June 2008. Dhaka.
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), 2010. Corruption in the Service
Sectors: National Household Survey 2010. December 2010, Dhaka.
Transparency International, 2009. The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide. July
2009, Berlin, Germany.
Vogt, J., Mallick, B., Mahboob, A.S., 2009. Social Supremacy and location of cyclone
centre: a determinant of social vulnerability analysis in a Coastal Union of
Bangladesh. In: Conference Proceedings: Water and Flood Management 2009,
Dhaka, pp. 415–423.
World Bank, 2000. Corruption in Bangladesh: Costs and Cures. World Bank, April 7,
Dhaka.
Zaman, I. and Khuda, M., 2011. Climate Change and Corruption Leave the World’s
Largest Mangrove Forest in Peril. In Transparency International, 2011. Global
Corruption Report: Climate Change. Earthscan, London.
